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Abstract
International commodity and capital flows provide channels for the transmission of the
effects of demographic changes in large countries onto small open economies by altering
the prices and interest rates facing them. This implies that even small countries with
relatively young populations are potentially vulnerable to the effects of population aging in
large industrial economies. To address this issue, which has largely been overlooked in
previous literature, this paper considers the case of European Union and Turkey and
shows, within an overlapping generations general equilibrium framework, that spillovers
of the demographic shock in Europe would intensify the changes that Turkey would
experience during its own demographic transition. D 2001 Society for Policy Modeling.
Published by Elsevier Science Inc.
JEL classification: C68; F10; F20; F40; J10; J26
Keywords: Demographic shocks and aging populations; Overlapping generations; Simulation models
1. Introduction
Most industrial countries are currently experiencing considerable demographic
changes with significant long-term consequences. The fraction of the population
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over age 65 in these countries is projected to increase sharply in the next few
decades. While this is partly due to increasing life expectancy and declining
fertility rates, a more important reason is the fertility shock of the postwar period.
As the so-called baby boom generations (born during the late 1940s and the early
1950s) keep getting older, the growth in the population share of elderly is
becoming increasingly visible in many countries, and will be evident shortly after
the year 2000. Projections by the United Nations for the OECD area as a whole
show that the share of the population over age 65 will rise from 15% today to
22% in 2040, outweighing the decline in the share of younger population
projected for the same period. As a result, the ratio of population outside the
working age (those under 20 and those 65 years and older) to the part of
population between the ages of 20 and 64 is projected to increase. Measuring the
overall dependency shares of population in the OECD area, this ratio is expected
to exceed 0.7 in the 2040s, representing a more than 10 percentage points
increase beyond its value in the 1980s.
A higher dependency ratio has a number of important implications for both
the macro- and microeconomic spheres of the economy.1 The macroeconomic
implications follow from its direct and indirect effects of a higher dependency
ratio on national savings and investment. First, by changing the term structure
and the level of age-dependent expenditures by the governments (such as
pension and health care payments), a higher dependency ratio affects the budget
position of the government and the level of public (dis)savings. Secondly, as
shown by various generational accounting studies (e.g., Gokhale, Kotlikoff, &
Sabelhaus, 1996), it increases consumption relative to output, and lowers the
national saving rate, thereby slowing down capital formation. Thirdly, the decline
in the share of population in the working age implies a fall in labor supply.
Unless sustained improvements are recorded in labor productivity growth and/or
labor force participation behavior, this might lead to reductions in per capita
outputs (Turner, Giorno, de Serres, Vourch, & Richardson, 1998). Naturally, such
effects are not without microeconomic consequences. The decline in savings and
the increasing share of consumption in GDP imply a change in the composition
of demand and hence must be expected to affect the relative prices of consumer
and investment goods. On the supply side, the expected decline in labor supply,
coupled with the slow down in capital formation, would cause changes in
capital– labor ratios.2 The changing capital– labor ratios, in turn, would alter
relative factor prices leading to second-round effects on resource allocation.
Furthermore, the changes in the relative capital intensities across traded and
nontraded sectors are likely to affect the real exchange and trade patterns,
1 For a nontechnical, yet very insightful, account of these implications, see Peterson (1999).
2 While the resulting change in capital – labor ratios may be in either direction depending upon the
relative magnitudes of the effects on capital formation and labor supply, Auerbach, Kotlikoff,
Hagemann, and Nicoletti (1989) predict an increase in economy-wide capital – labor ratios in the
developed economies.
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creating effects on other countries as well. The effects on other countries could
be particularly significant if the countries facing the changes in demographic
structure are large in the international trade sense of the term. Under these
circumstances, trade provides a channel for transmission of the effects of
demographic shocks experienced by large countries onto small open economies
through the terms of trade effects it creates. With their inability to affect world
prices individually, most of the developing countries fall into the latter category.
This implies that even small developing countries, which have not experienced
similar baby boom shocks and hence have not yet faced a population aging
problem themselves, are potentially vulnerable to the effects of population aging
in the larger countries of the OECD area.
Given the universal trend of declining mortality rates, the small open
economies in the developing world will also face the consequences of population
aging and related demographic issues eventually. In the absence of demographic
shock transmission, however, such issues must be expected to surface at a later
stage during the course of these countries’ own demographic transition.3 So, the
need for an investigation of the direction and the magnitude of spillover effects
arises as developing countries become increasingly exposed to the consequences
of demographic shocks in the developed world through trade and capital flows.
This is an issue that has largely been overlooked in the literature on the economic
effects of population aging,4 as the overwhelming majority of the existing works
focus on social security and related macroeconomic aspects of aging in developed
countries. As noted by Peterson (1999), the investigation of the indirect effects of
aging populations in the developed world on other countries is one of the critical
areas where more research is severely needed. This paper aims to help fill this gap
by addressing the demographic transmission issue for the case of European Union
(EU) and Turkey. More precisely, we investigate the economic impact on Turkey
of the demographic shock in Europe as well as the effects of Turkey’s own
demographic transition, using an overlapping generations (OGs) computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model. We argue that in the context of the Customs
Union agreement, which Turkey recently signed with the EU, such an analysis of
the EU–Turkey interaction is especially appropriate.
In terms of the framework of investigation employed, the present study links
up particularly well with the recent, empirical literature on the OGs analysis of
aging within a general equilibrium setup. These empirical analyses have their
theoretical roots in the lifecycle models of 1950s and 1960s, and have become
increasingly popular since the mid-1980s. The growth of this literature within the
last decade began with the appearance of the generational accounting studies that
examine the first-round economic impacts of aging through simple projections
3 For a recent comparative analysis of the demographic transition across several countries in the
developing world (including Turkey), see Yousef (1998).
4 Notable exceptions were Kenc and Sayan (1997, 1998) and Turner et al. (1998).
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(see, e.g., Gokhale et al., 1996; Hagemann & Nicoletti, 1989; Halter &
Hemming, 1987; Heller, Hemming, & Kohnert, 1986). Introducing general
equilibrium aspects, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) examined population aging
through a dynamic model (see also Auerbach et al., 1989). This model was later
modified by others and extended in various directions. The model in this paper
generalizes the setup in the 1987 and 1989 papers by Auerbach and his co-
authors by allowing for variable terms of trade and an imperfectly elastic supply
of world savings. It can also be viewed as a generalization of the model in
Perraudin and Pujol (1991) as we incorporate nonstationary population dynamics
and technological change.5
This study also relates to the recent literature on dynamic general equilibrium
analysis of trade policy issues in developing countries (for a brief survey, see
Devarajan & Go, 1998), and nicely complements them by introducing OG
aspects. Three recent studies that provide especially relevant examples of this
literature are Diao, Roe, and Yeldan (1998, 1999) and Mercenier and Yeldan
(1997). The paper by Mercenier and Yeldan is particularly interesting as it
addresses the resource allocation and welfare effects of the Customs Union
Agreement between Turkey and the EU, using a dynamic general equilibrium
model that overlooks the OG aspects. These aspects are introduced into our
model through consumption, bequest, and labor supply decisions that OGs of
households make over their lifecycle. We consider households that live for a total
of 12 periods of 5 years each beyond the working age, and allow nonstationary
population dynamics with the only restriction that the population growth is
assumed to start and end on a balanced path on which each age cohort makes up a
constant fraction of the population.
While lacking mechanisms for such population dynamics capable of capturing
complicated patterns of baby boom and bust along the transition path, the latter
group of studies cited above tends to use a more disaggregated classification of
sectors. As compared to nine sectors explicitly modeled in Mercenier and Yeldan
(1997), for example, we distinguish three sectors so as to keep the model
structure manageable. Two of the sectors we model are domestic sectors—one
producing a nontradable good, and the other an export good. The demand for the
country’s exports is incompletely elastic, as is the supply of savings from the rest
of the world (ROW). Aside from domestically produced goods, households
consume one imported good. They possess nested Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) utility functions over three consumption goods and leisure,
and also derive a utility from the bequests they make. The production technology
employed by domestic firms is characterized by CES production functions of
5 Other recent OGs, general equilibrium exercises typically address social security issues and can
be found, for example, in Broer and Lassila (1996), Huang, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1997), and
Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995), and, for Turkey, in Sayan and Kenc (1999). An OGs,
general equilibrium analysis with a broader emphasis on macroeconomic effects of aging can be found
in Thoenissen (1997).
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capital and labor, with firms maximizing profits over time, and altering their
capital stocks subject to convex costs of adjustment.
In modeling Turkey’s international transactions, we treat the rest of the world as
made up of two separate blocs: the EU and other countries. For the EU, we
consider a scaled down version aggregating four countries (hereafter, EU4):
Germany, France, Italy, and UK. These are the major trading partners of Turkey,
with their respective shares typically ranking among the top five in Turkey’s
exports/imports. Based on trade figures, we take EU4 as accounting for 40% of
Turkey’s trade, with other countries accounting for 60%. Turkey is taken as a small
country with respect to trade flows and it faces given world prices, weighted
according to the trade shares of Turkey’s trading partners within and outside the
EU. So, any change in the prices of one of these blocs alters world prices facing
Turkey, accordingly with the weights assigned to that bloc. Since we are primarily
interested in the transmission of demographic shock in the EU onto the Turkish
economy, however, we consider the effects of changes in EU4 prices alone.
Our simulation experiments are based on two scenarios concerning the effects
of demographic changes facing Turkey. In the first scenario, only the changes
observed during the course of this country’s own demographic transition are
considered without allowing for the transmission of EU4 demographic shocks
onto the Turkish economy. In the second scenario, transmission is allowed,
enabling one to compare the results with and without the effects of demographic
shock in the EU4 transmitted onto Turkey. In both simulations, demographic
changes are modeled by introducing population projections by the United
Nations for the 1995–2050 period into the model-generated population profiles
based on stable population growth assumption for the starting period (1990) and
the periods after 2055. In modeling demographic transmission, a simulation is run
for EU4 so as to generate prices resulting from the demographic shock in the
EU4, which are then fed into the Turkish economy simulation.
The results of our simulation experiments suggest that the demographic
developments leading to population aging and changes in age composition of
the Turkish population will affect the time paths of major macroeconomic variables
considerably. Furthermore, the demographic shock in Europe magnifies these
effects visibly. The transmission of demographic shock from Europe has implica-
tions for such macroeconomic variables as consumption, savings, investment,
output, and labor supply in Turkey, as well as on wages, exchange, and interest
rates in the country. Given that the formation of the Customs Union between
Turkey and the EU clearly facilitates the transmission of these effects, Turkish
policy makers will have to watch closely the demographic developments in Europe
as these appear to have a bearing on Turkey’s long-term growth prospects.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the model, explicitly
showing how the assumptions about household and firm behavior are modeled.
Section 3 explains the parameterization of the model. Section 4 describes the
simulation scenarios and reports the results, and Section 5 concludes the paper by
discussing some of the policy implications of results.
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2. The model
The model employed in this paper is a multiperiod OGs model. Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) first developed a numerical OGs model to study the US
economy. Its realism in capturing heterogeneities among age groups encouraged
researchers to extend the Auerbach–Kotlikoff model in various directions.
Perraudin and Pujol (1991) generalized Auerbach–Kotlikoff framework by
introducing a demand curve for exports, a supply curve for savings from the
rest of the world, and domestic industries producing export goods and non-
tradables. Several researchers added further realism into consumer behavior by
introducing bequests and probability of dying.6
The model described here generalizes the Perraudin–Pujol framework by
introducing bequests,7 labor-endowment-augmenting technological change, and a
growing population. Furthermore, the solution algorithms employed here are new
to this study.
2.1. Household behavior
The modeling of household behavior follows the lifecycle approach. Aggreg-
ate consumption, saving, and labor supply are derived from the intertemporal
optimizing behavior of forward-looking age cohorts under perfect foresight
assumption. Each cohort is assumed to have an economic life of 60 years—
becoming active at age 21 (16 in Turkey) and dying at 80 (75 in Turkey). To limit
the computational burden, we assume that a time period equals 5 years. Hence, in
any given period, 12 cohorts of different ages are economically active. We
differentiate generations by birth date, t0. Thus, at any given period t, households
that belong to generation t0 will be at the age of t t0. We suppose that during
transition periods, the population varies over time, while in the steady state it
increases at a constant rate.
Households derive utility from consumption, leisure, and bequest-giving. The
lifetime utility U(t,t0) of generation t0 as of period t takes the following additively
separable form (Eq. (1)):
Uðt; t0Þ  1a
Xt0þn1
s¼t
uðs; t0Þa
ð1þ dÞst þ aB
bðt0 þ n 1; t0Þa
ð1þ dÞn1
 !
; ð1Þ
where d is the rate of time preference, u(s,t0) is an index showing the utility that
the generation t0 derives from leisure, l, and consumption, c, of goods 1, 2, and 3,
and from the bequest, b(t0 + n 1,t0), made at the beginning of the last period of
6 See, for instance, Auerbach et al. (1989) for models with bequests, and Broer, Westerhaut, and
Bovenberg (1994) for models with the probability of dying.
7 Empirical studies by Gale and Scholz (1994) and Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) on savings
behavior suggest that bequest motives are important determinants of savings behavior.
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life, n. In the equation, aB is a parameter showing the intensity of utility from
bequests made, and a = 11/a, where a > 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between utilities in different periods. u(s,t0), that is, the household’s utility at
time s from leisure, l, and the consumption of nontradable, c1, imported, c2, and
exportable, c3, goods, is decomposed as follows (Eqs. (2), (3), and (4)):
uðs; t0Þ  ½ð1 aLÞcðs; t0Þr þ aLlðs; t0Þr1=r; ð2Þ
cðs; t0Þ  ½ð1 aTÞc1ðs; t0Þr1 þ aTc0ðs; t0Þr1 1=r1 ; ð3Þ
c0ðs; t0Þ  ½ð1 aXÞc2ðs; t0Þr2 þ aXc3ðs; t0Þr2 1=r2 ; ð4Þ
where r, r1, r2 are parameters used to define the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure, nontradables and tradables, and imports and
exportables, respectively. Likewise, aL, aT, aX are parameters showing intensity
of utility from leisure, consumption of tradables, and consumption of
exportables, respectively.
We assume that all households retire at the beginning of some given period,
and that households’ marginal labor productivities vary over the lifecycle.
Within each group, productivity, and hence wages, are assumed to increase
initially, peaking at Period 5 (ages 40 for Turkey and 45 for EU4) and declining
slightly thereafter.
Taxation and transfers affect household behavior through their influence on
income and prices. Lump sum transfers have a direct impact on income, VAT
affects consumer prices, and direct taxation (including social security contri-
butions) has an influence on interest rates and wages. Households maximize
utility subject to an intertemporal wealth constraint. Letting W(t,t0) represent the
lifetime wealth of generation t0 at period t, rt the interest rate at t, and tr the tax
rate on household interest income, the lifetime wealth constraint is given by
(Eq. (5)):
W ðt; t0Þ ¼ bðt0 þ n 1; t0ÞdHðn; tÞ
þ
Xt0þn1
s¼t
ð1þ tnÞpðsÞcðs; t0ÞdHðs; tÞ ð5Þ
where tn is the rate of VAT and p(s) is a price index involving parameters of the
utility function. The discounting factor for period s at current period t, dH(s,t), is
defined as:
dHðs; tÞ 
Qs1
n¼t
½1þ ð1 tnÞrn1 8n > t
1 n ¼ t:
8><
>:
T. Kenc, S. Sayan / Journal of Policy Modeling 23 (2001) 677–702 683
Total lifetime wealth, W, equals the sum of human wealth, Wh, pension wealth,
Wp, and anticipated future bequests, Wb. Let ti for i= x,w,r,d,g,v denote the rates
of employee social security contributions, wage income tax, interest income tax,
dividend income tax, capital gains tax, and value added tax, respectively. If z(s,t0)
denotes the lump sum transfers received from the government, w(s) the wage rate,
and e(t t0) the ‘‘effective labor input,’’ human wealth inclusive of lump sum
transfer payments can then be written as (Eq. (6)):
Whðt; t0Þ ¼
Xt0þn1
s¼t
½ð1 tx  twÞwðsÞeðt  t0Þð1 lðs; t0ÞÞ
þ zðs; t0ÞdHðs; tÞ: ð6Þ
Let us define the parameters of the pension system as follows. gac is the accrual
factor, nr is the retirement age, n¯ is the number of years worked to qualify for the
maximum level of old age pension benefit, w¯(t0) is the average wage rate
calculated by taking into account wage income and working hours during the
period specified for this purpose by the pension authorities, and l is the factor
used to index pension income to wages. Then, social security wealth may be
written as (Eq. (7)):
Wpðt; t0Þ ¼
gac
Pt0þn1
s¼t0þnr
½ ðt0ÞgwðsÞ1ldHðs; tÞ if t0 þ nr 
 t
gac
Pt0þn1
s¼t
½ ðt0ÞlwðsÞ1ldHðs; tÞ if t0 þ nr < t:
8>><
>>:
ð7Þ
Finally, if br(t+ nb,t0) is bequests received in period t+ nb with nb denoting the
age bequest received, and tb the rate of taxes on bequests, anticipated bequest
wealth may be written as (Eq. (8)):
Wbðt; t0Þ ¼
brðt0 þ nb  1; t0Þð1 tbÞdHðs; tÞ if t0 þ nb  1 
 t
ð8Þ
0 if t0 þ nb  1 < t:
8><
>:
We assume in our simulations that bequests are made in the last period of life.
Households have offspring in the first period of adult life (i.e., at the age of
20–25 years) and hence, children receive bequests at the age of 60, that is,
nb = 60 (55 for Turkey).
If there were no further constraints, solving the dynamic programming
problem for a given household would be easy, enabling us to derive closed form
consumption and leisure demands. However, we assume that the household is not
allowed to supply labor after the retirement age, nr. One may think of this as
reducing the shadow wage just sufficiently that the household wishes to supply
zero labor in its last few periods. Alternatively, one may consider the retirement
n¯w¯
n¯w¯
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as a period when the productivity falls to zero. Since the shadow wage cannot be
obtained in closed form, neither can the associated consumption and leisure
demands. We must therefore solve the household’s program numerically.
2.2. Firm behavior
We assume that the economy contains two domestic industries labeled 1 and 3,
respectively, producing nontradable and tradable (exportable) goods under
perfect competition. Each sector is made up of identical firms whose technologies
are characterized by constant returns-to-scale CES production functions with
capital,8 K(t), and labor, L(t), as the arguments. Scaling up variables, the
production function for the industry as a whole is (Eq. (9)):
Fi½KðtÞ; LðtÞ 2i ½2i0 KðtÞqi þ ð1 2i0ÞLðtÞqi 1=qi i ¼ 1; 3: ð9Þ
In each period, producers decide on cost-minimizing intensities of labor given
the current stock of capital. They alter the stock of capital through investment so
as to maximize the value of firms’ equity. Optimal investment involves balancing
the costs of new capital (acquisition and installation costs) against the higher
future revenues made possible by a larger capital stock. Adjustment costs are
assumed to take the form:
CKðIt=Kt1Þ 
x
2
½It=Kt1k2
It=Kt1
for I=K > k
0 for I=K  k;
8<
: ð10Þ
where x, k are adjustment cost parameters. If firms invest in this way and
adjustment costs are convex, the capital stock will follow a smooth transition
path. In equilibrium, it must be the case that dividends and capital gains equal the
required return (Eq. (11)):
ð1 tdÞDðtÞ þ ð1 tgÞ½V ðt þ 1Þ  VNðtÞ  V ðtÞ
¼ ð1 trÞrðtÞV ðtÞ; ð11Þ
where V is the equity value of the firm at the beginning of the year, D is
dividend payments at the end of the year, VN, the proceeds from share issues,
and td, tr, tg are the tax rates on dividend and interest income, and the accrual-
8 In fact, capital is a composite good made up of the domestic and imported goods, each with a
fixed share.
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equivalent capital gains tax rate, respectively. Ruling out bubbles, we can write
this as (Eq. (12)):
V ðtÞ ¼
X1
s¼t
1 td
1 tg DðsÞ  VNðsÞ

 
dFðs; tÞ ð12Þ
where
dFðs; tÞ 
Ys
v¼t
½1þ ð1 trÞrn=ð1 tgÞ1:
To solve the firms’ programming problems, we must make assumptions
concerning their financial behavior. We assume, in particular, that (i) firms pay
dividends equal to a constant fraction of after-tax profits net of depreciation; (ii)
they issue debt to maintain a constant debt–capital ratio; and (iii) they issue new
shares as the marginal source of finance. This financial behavior is consistent
with the assumptions behind the ‘‘old view’’ of capital taxation. The adjustment
cost function is assumed to be convex in the ratio of investment (I) to the capital
stock (K). We also assume that the installation costs of capital are internal to the
firm. Such behavior gives rise to a q investment function.
2.3. The government
The model considers typical functions of the government as public expendi-
tures on goods, maintenance of various transfer payments, the levying of taxes,
and the issuance of debt. Total public expenditures on goods and services, and
total transfer payments fall into four categories: public goods, education, health
care and unemployment benefits, and other transfers.9 The expenditures on
public goods are determined exogenously, whereas expenditures on the remain-
ing categories are determined endogenously as the age composition of popu-
lation changes. It must be noted that pension balances are also age-dependent,
but these are treated separately through the budgets of publicly managed social
security authorities (as opposed to the central government budget described
above). At any given period in time, discounted present value of total tax
revenue, T(t), and discounted present value of total government spending, G(t),
are related to each other through the following intertemporal budget constraint
(Eq. (13)):
X1
t¼1
TðtÞdGðtÞ ¼
X1
t¼1
GðtÞdGðtÞ þ BGð1Þ; ð13Þ
9 On account of the fact that Turkish government provides no unemployment benefits, this
spending item has been taken to be equal to zero for Turkey.
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where
dGðtÞ ¼
Qt1
s¼1
½1þ ð1 trÞrðsÞ=ð1 tgÞ1 8t > 1
1 t ¼ 1
8><
>:
and BG is government debt.
The changes in the level of public expenditures affect the distribution of wealth
across different generations through their impact on government debt, BG. Given
the emphasis placed upon the transmitted effects of demographic shocks in the
EU, and Turkey’s own demographic transition, this treatment of the government’s
role in the economy is viewed as appropriate for the purposes of this paper.
2.4. Treatment of open economy features in the model
In modeling Turkey’s international transactions, we take two separate blocs
into account: the EU represented by EU4 and the rest of the world. While we
consider Turkey as facing a weighted average of given world prices in its trade,
the treatment of country size with respect to capital flows in the model departs
from the commonly adopted small country assumption. Since the stylized facts of
international capital markets suggest that the supply of world savings is
imperfectly elastic for all but the smallest countries, the following three
assumptions are adopted.
First, the demand for the export good (which is also consumed by domestic
households and used as an input by firms) is assumed to be given by a constant
elasticity function, X3 =X0P3
w where X0 is a positive constant, X3 and P3 are the
quantity demanded of export good and the relevant foreign currency price,
respectively, and w is the elasticity parameter. Second, the net supply of savings
from the rest of the world, WROW, is related to the difference between the
domestic interest rate, r(t), and the weighted average of EU4 and other country
interest rates, r¯, according to the equation:
WROW ¼ sign½rðtÞ ðjrðtÞ  jÞw
where w* is the elasticity parameter, and K¯ is a nonnegative constant. K¯ = 0
represents the case of no capital mobility, but for any positive value of K¯, the
degree of capital mobility would depend on the elasticity parameter. When
w* =1, the interest rate is given internationally, that is, the small country
assumption holds for capital markets. (If w =1, the same is true of the goods
market.) w* = 0, on the other hand, implies that there is a constant flow of
capital between the domestic economy and the rest of the world, which would
be maintained through the adjustment of domestic interest rate. For relatively
large industrial economies such as those in the EU4, it is safer to assume that
the elasticity parameter would take values that are strictly between zero and
infinity, implying a less than perfect mobility of capital. Even though it is
K¯ r¯ r¯
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smaller in size, the same assumption can safely be made about Turkey as well,
since the relatively less developed nature of capital markets in this country
would not allow for perfect mobility of capital. This treatment may be defended
in the light of the work of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and others on the
limited degree of international capital market diversification, for both the
industrial economies of the EU and a middle income economy like Turkey.
Finally, the third assumption fixes the foreign currency price of the imported
good, which is consumed by households and used by firms in their constant
coefficient production of capital, at P2.
3. Parameterization
Some of the utility and production function parameters were selected by
drawing upon a large number of empirical studies, and values of other parameters
were found through calibration. This section summarizes how the information
available in the literature was used while searching for values of various
parameters, and reports the values picked for some of the key parameters.
For the utility function, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one of the
key parameters. In the literature, estimated values for this parameter typically lie
either within a low range of 0.2–0.4 (see Bayoumi, 1990; Hall, 1988 for
estimates based on US and UK time series data), or within a high range of
1.0–1.3 (see Lawrance, 1991; Mankiw, Rotemberg, & Summers, 1985 for US
estimates from quarterly panel data and time series, respectively). With somewhat
more faith placed in microeconomic estimates, this elasticity is taken here as
equal to 0.9 for EU4 and 0.75 for Turkey. Of the other utility function parameters,
the consumption–leisure elasticity of substitution is set at 1.1. This yields an
uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply of 0.2 that appears to be sensible
for the combined labor supply of a husband and wife couple. Empirical support
for such a value may be found in various studies surveyed by Hum and Simpson
(1994). The bequest preference parameter is taken as 0.50 for EU4 and 0.75 for
Turkey, on account of the higher level of altruism one would expect to observe in
this country. These values are generally consistent with the levels estimated by
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981).
In accordance with the findings of Davies (1992), Gottschalk and Joyce (1992),
and Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992), the wage–age profile used is hump-shaped.
Kotlikoff and Gokhale, in particular, argue that productivity peaks at around age
45 and declines thereafter. Both Davies and Gottschalk and Joyce find, using
cross-country data, that the ratios of mean earnings for 40- to 49-year-old men to
mean earnings for 25- to 29-year-old men are in the range of 1.08–1.30.
Consistently with the parameters in Perraudin and Pujol (1991), the elasticities
of substitution between different goods that appear in the utility function are
picked for EU4 as 1.2 for tradables and nontradables, and as 0.8 for two different
tradables. For Turkey, the values available in the literature were for elasticity of
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substitution between imports and domestic goods, and that between exports and
domestic goods. The respective values of these parameters are taken to be 0.9 and
0.8 as in Celasun (1986) and Yeldan (1996).
As for the elasticities in production, a search of the existing literature revealed
the following values. Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between labor and
capital for the US range typically between 0.5 and 0.9 (see, e.g., Artus, 1984;
Feldstein, 1983). Artus (1984) also obtained an estimate of 0.85 for Canada. As
for European countries, To¨rma¨, Rutherford, and Vaittinen (1995) made an attempt
to estimate the Finnish production function parameters in traded and nontraded
industries. At 0.915 and 0.703 for traded and nontraded industries, respectively,
their estimates are in the range of US and Canadian ones. The values estimated
from Finnish data were used for EU4 simulations as these values not only fit well
to the commodity aggregation scheme employed here, but also are more likely to
be relevant for EU4 countries. For Turkey, on the other hand, the values were
chosen, following Yeldan (1996), as 0.85 for tradable and 0.65 for nontradable
goods industries. Another important pair of parameters is adjustment cost
parameters, x, k, in Eq. (10). These were assigned values similar to those chosen
by Summers (1981).
Table 1
Baseline parameterization
Parameters Value for EU4 Value for Turkey
Elasticities
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.900 0.750
Consumption– leisure elasticity of substitution 1.100 1.100
Tradable–nontradable elasticity of substitution 1.200
Elasticity of substitution between tradables 0.800
Elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods 0.800
Elasticity of substitution between exports and domestic goods 0.900
Elasticity of demand for exports  1.200  2.000
Elasticity of savings supply by ROW 5.000 5.000
Production elasticity (nontraded) 0.703 0.850
Production elasticity (export good) 0.915 0.650
Assumptions about ages
Life expectancy 80 75
The age when individuals begin to work 20 15
The age when individuals receive bequests 60 55
Other parameters
Bequest preference parameter 0.500 0.750
Adjustment cost parameter, k 0.050 0.050
Adjustment cost parameter, x 20 20
Capital–output ratio 3.000 4.000
Depreciation rate for tradable industries 0.100 0.075
Depreciation rate for nontradable industries 0.075 0.050
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Concerning the demand elasticities, the rest of the world elasticity of export
demand, w, was set at  1.2 for EU4 as in Perraudin and Pujol (1991) and  2 for
Turkey as in Yeldan (1996). The ROW elasticity of savings supply, w*, on the
other hand, was taken as 5 as in Perraudin and Pujol. Finally, the constants in the
savings supply function were chosen in such a way that a 1% deviation from world
interest rates elicited a change in world savings supply equal to 10% of GDP.
Table 1 summarizes the values of key parameters used in simulation runs. As
for taxes, the rates to be employed are chosen, wherever feasible, as average and
marginal income tax rates for married couples with two children. Wage income
tax rates come from three different publications of OECD (1991a, 1992, 1993).
Average and marginal social security contribution rates come from OECD
(1991a), while marginal rates are taken from OECD (1992) and (1993). The
savings tax rates employed are for taxes on interest income as in OECD (1991b).
Finally, VAT rates are taken from various issues of OECD Economic Surveys of
individual member countries. Other relevant information on pension schemes
needed in model implementation are taken from OECD sources, Foster (1994),
and Van der Noord and Herd (1993). More information on Turkish pension
system and pension parameters can be found in Sayan and Kiraci (2001) and
Topal (1999).
4. Simulation results
We now consider the effects of the demographic shock transmitted from the
EU4 onto Turkey. In order to gauge these transmission effects on key variables of
Turkish economy, simulation results are compared across two experiments, each
conducted by feeding a different set of exogenous values for world prices of
tradables and the world interest rate to the Turkish economy model. The world
prices and interest rate are essentially indexes weighted by respective shares of
EU4 and other countries in Turkey’s international transactions. The first simu-
lation scenario is meant to capture the effects resulting from Turkey’s own
demographic transition when the country faces a given set of world prices and
interest rate. In the second scenario, on the other hand, the world prices and
interest rates facing Turkey change, along with the demographically induced
changes in EU4 over the period under consideration. To conduct this experiment,
we first simulate the model for EU4 and obtain relevant prices that prevail in the
presence of the demographic shock in Europe. We then plug these prices into the
Turkish economy simulation so as to simulate the change in world prices facing
Turkey in accordance with the share of EU4. A comparison of the results across
scenarios allows for an observation of differential effects resulting from the
transmission of the effects of the demographic shock in EU4 onto Turkey,
through the channels described above.
Both simulations consider the period from the year 1990 until the end of
model horizon. Year 1990 is chosen to represent the current situation and the
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periods we particularly want to consider, that is, 1990 onwards. We take the
model horizon as extending into 71 periods of 5 years each after 1990. At the 71st
period, various growth rates and the population share of each age cohort become
equal to calibrated values. To solve the intertemporal equilibrium of the model
over the model horizon, we follow the tradition of earlier CGE works such as the
seminal work by Adelman and Robinson (1978) and employ a Fair–Taylor type
of the Gauss–Seidel algorithm written in the programming language Gauss. The
algorithm is quite robust and works well with a range of different starting values.
Starting from a guessed vector of prices in each of the 5-year periods considered,
we calculate an updated vector by sequentially solving for each period’s prices so
as to eliminate excess demands in the different markets with future prices held
fixed at the currently guessed values.10 Roughly 50 such iterations are required to
find equilibrium state variables to a satisfactory degree of precision.
4.1. The nature of demographic transitions
We assume that at the beginning, the economy is on the balanced growth path
characterized by a constant population growth of 0.75% (0.5% for the EU4) and a
productivity growth of 3% (2% for the EU4) per annum. This implies that
younger age cohorts are 1.0075 times greater in size than the previous age
cohorts. Between 1995 and 2050, however, we change the age composition and
growth rates of population by using demographic projections obtained from the
UN sources. After 2050, we use the model-generated population profiles based
on stable population growth assumption. This implies that the model starts, after
2050, to converge to an equilibrium where various growth rates and the
population share of each age cohort become equal to calibrated values.
Changes in demographic profiles, as captured by exogenously fed demo-
graphic projections, affect dependency ratios. This, in turn, causes changes in
consumption and savings patterns, as well as the composition of government
spending by age groups, leading to changes in prices. To highlight the compar-
ative magnitudes and directions of demographic changes taking place after the
European baby boom of the 1950s, the fractions of population in different age
groups in EU4 and Turkey are reported in Table 2. The corresponding changes in
dependency ratios for EU4 and Turkey are shown in Fig. 1.
Both Fig. 1 and Table 2 show that not only the size but also the timing of
demographic transitions differ considerably for Turkey and EU4. Turkey always
has a relatively younger population as compared to the largest four European
countries, as it has a higher population growth rate. It is particularly evident from
Fig. 1 that the ratio of population in the young age up to 19 to the working age in
EU4 drops markedly first, and then begins to rise as older baby boomers retire
after 2010. The decline in this (‘‘young age dependency’’) ratio is even more
10 We use NLSYS application of Gauss for this procedure.
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drastic for Turkey because of the birth rates that have slumped somewhat
drastically since the 1970s in this country.11 Also shown in Fig. 1 is the ratio
of people over 65 to those in the working age (the ‘‘old age dependency ratio’’),
which rises steadily for a few decades after 2010 in both the EU4 and Turkey, and
stabilizes just above 25% after 2060 in the EU4, and just above 35% after 2090 in
Turkey. Thus, the population gradually becomes older in the EU4 starting from
the 1990s, whereas Turkey begins to experience population aging following the
period after 2020.
In simulating the model, we adopt the simplifying assumption that net
immigration is zero, since treating immigration explicitly would complicate our
projections considerably. In reality, immigration has affected the age profile of the
Turkish population at various points in time. In the 1960s and in the second half
of the 1970s, in particular, there was significant emigration to other European
countries, and especially to Germany. Yet, with the restrictions imposed upon the
inflow of Turkish labor into the EU in the last two decades, the assumption of
zero emigration has become increasingly more realistic. Given the likelihood that
these restrictions will be maintained into the foreseeable future, the assumption
may be viewed as sufficiently realistic.
4.2. Transmitted effects of the demographic shock in the EU4
Simulating the model for changes in demographic size and composition is
likely to exert price effects (general equilibrium effects) on the economy as well
as first-round effects on factor supplies. The first-round effects are the effects that
Table 2
Population age distributions for EU4 and Turkey (in percent)
1950 1975 1990 2000
Age group EU4 Turkey EU4 Turkey EU4 Turkey EU4 Turkey
0–14 23.669 38.330 23.238 40.105 17.725 35.505 17.072 29.849
15–39 43.474 44.822 41.273 42.923 44.244 46.450 42.271 49.647
40–64 22.914 13.557 22.021 12.455 23.014 13.265 24.332 14.475
65 + 9.943 3.292 13.468 4.517 15.017 4.779 16.324 6.029
2010 2025 2050 Steady state
Age group EU4 Turkey EU4 Turkey EU4 Turkey EU4 Turkey
0–14 15.907 25.831 15.860 21.742 18.797 18.302 20.946 21.909
15–39 38.572 48.838 34.325 43.851 34.764 34.999 38.713 39.194
40–64 27.428 18.035 29.764 23.744 25.089 26.722 23.647 23.054
65 + 18.093 7.297 20.051 10.663 21.350 19.997 16.694 15.843
11 To assure comparability of plots in Fig. 1, the working ages are defined as 20–64 for both EU4
and Turkey even though the model takes the beginning of working age in Turkey as 15.
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would have been observed on factor supplies if factor prices and incomes could
be held constant in the course of the country’s own demographic transition (i.e.,
in the absence of the effects transmitted from Europe). In other words, these are
the effects that arise due to the changes in the age composition of the population
over time as the age composition has a direct bearing on the supply of labor and
capital (savings) to the economy. Additional changes are introduced to the time
paths of factor supplies and other variables, as factor prices and incomes are
allowed to vary along with the changes in the age composition of the country
(second-round price effects or general equilibrium effects). Since the transmission
of the effects of the demographic shock in Europe through price and interest rate
channels is also expected to alter the time paths of economic variables in Turkey,
we may compare the time paths with and without the demographic developments
in Europe taken into account.
To distinguish the general equilibrium effects transmitted onto Turkish
economy from the effects of Turkey’s own demographic transition, we simulate
the Turkish economy model with and without feeding the tradable prices and
interest rates obtained from the EU4 simulation. These results indicate that
substantial fluctuations must be expected in real and nominal macroeconomic
variables as the profile of Turkish population with respect to the age composi-
tion changes during the country’s own demographic transition even without the
transmission effects. These effects might be observed through the time paths
that various variables would follow as shown in Figs. 2–4. The figures showing
Fig. 1. Dependency ratios.
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percentage deviations from trend values generally indicate that transmission of
demographic shocks generate significant output, consumption, and savings
effects. For example, between 1990 and 2060, the real output is expected to
fluctuate between levels that are about 5% below and 18% above its trend value
Fig. 2. Capital accumulation effects.
Fig. 3. Macroeconomic effects.
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(Fig. 3), and the fluctuations for such variables as consumption, household
savings, and investment are larger (Figs. 3 and 4). When its effects are
transmitted through price and interest rate channels, the demographic shock in
Europe is expected to magnify these effects. The transmission effects are visible
on the values over time of all variables including investment, household
savings, consumption, and labor supply, as well as the exchange rate, interest
rate, and wages.
The results can be interpreted as follows: As age composition of the
population changes during the demographic transition, differences in labor supply
and saving behaviors across age cohorts exert an immediate impact on overall
labor supply and savings. For instance, as the ratio of working population in
Turkey increases between 1990 and 2020 (Fig. 1), overall labor supply increases
during the same period. As indicated by Fig. 3, this rise in the overall labor
supply would be approximately 20% higher than its baseline value when we
consider the case without transmission effects. In other words, the increase in
labor supply is solely due to the changes in age composition of Turkish
population during transition. Such increases in labor supply put downward
pressures on the wage rate. In the year 2000, for example, the wage rate falls
about 1.5% below the baseline rate. The decline in the wage rate induces firms to
increase the use of labor input. This, in turn, results in a rise in total output. These
movements can be followed in Figs. 3 and 4. As for movements in household
savings during this period, the results reveal that savings are not purely driven by
the demographic transition: While one would expect these savings to increase as
the working population ratio (total dependency ratio) increases (declines), this
Fig. 4. Price effects.
T. Kenc, S. Sayan / Journal of Policy Modeling 23 (2001) 677–702 695
does not happen. This apparently counterintuitive result is due to the forward-
looking nature of saving behavior in a dynamic setting. Since the rise in the
working population ratio will be followed by a decline after 2020, and the agents
know this with perfect foresight, firms and households in different age cohorts
predict contractionary effects of savings on the economy and do not respectively
invest and save more than they would otherwise have. Fig. 3 displays that savings
decrease from the beginning of the simulation period until the year 2040.
Increases in investment, financed mostly through internal funding generated by
firms, are immediate and short-lived as seen in Fig. 2. Changes in savings and
investment are reflected in the interest rate (Fig. 4). The exchange rate (expressed
as the domestic price of a unit of foreign currency) varies positively with
domestic output. In other words, when the output is high, the domestic currency
depreciates to induce foreigners to purchase more Turkish exports. So, whenever
the shock waves hitting Turkey add to the output effects to be observed during its
own demographic transition, the real exchange rate would increase (i.e., Turkish
Lira would depreciate) more than it would have in the absence of demographic
spillover. In the early 2000s, for example, the real exchange rate increases by
approximately 9% when transmission is allowed, and by about 7% when it is not
(Fig. 3). The difference between these magnitudes is about 29%, implying that
the additional depreciation of domestic currency caused by the demographic
developments in Europe may be considerable at times.
In general, when the EU4 demographic shock is transmitted through price and
interest rate channels, the effects that are expected to arise due solely to the
demographic changes in Turkey are magnified. The transmission effects on the
values over time of such variables as wages, exchange rate, and interest rate are
more visible relative to such real variables as investment, consumption, labor
supply, and output. Around the year 2020, for example, the real variables
including investment and output are 2–4 percentage points above their corres-
ponding values without transmission effects. The demographic shock in EU4 also
generates positive effects on capital accumulation and output, and leads to
reductions in prices of goods imported by Turkey and to rises in the demand
for Turkish exports. This clearly results in a positive terms-of-trade effect for
Turkey. Since the shock also reduces the interest rate in EU4, capital inflows to
Turkey increase, magnifying the positive effects on production and investment.
This implies that other small economies with a comparable income level and a
similar age composition of population to Turkey could also take advantage of the
lag between the pace of their own demographic transition and that in the larger
economies of OECD/EU area. Due to this lag, the faster aging of population in
the latter group of countries would cause their domestic interest rates to begin
falling earlier than small countries’. Thus, small economies with younger
populations could turn the positive interest rate differentials (to arise between
their domestic interest rates and those prevailing in the large countries) into an
opportunity for increased capital inflows over a certain period of their demo-
graphic transition. As attracting a higher share of foreign capital from large
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economies with aged populations would be a competitive process for small
countries, however, many of these countries would need to take additional policy
measures to (further) liberalize their investment and banking regulations so as to
facilitate movement of capital across borders and transfer of funds and to
introduce any structural reforms that may be needed to make their good and
labor markets more accommodating for foreign investors.12
As for the implications of the European demographic shock for the labor
market in Turkey, the results suggest that the increase in the wage rate between
2010 and 2190 would be magnified by the transmission of the demographic
shock in Europe, increasing beyond the case where the profile of the Turkish
population followed its own course of transition. This result is rather intuitive as
prices and interest rates that act as channels through which the demographic
shock in Europe is transmitted onto Turkey should also be expected to push up
the wages in Turkey towards those prevailing in the EU4. This, in turn, would
cause labor supply to increase more than it would otherwise have. It should be
noted here that while the direction of the effects to be observed in Turkish labor
market is not likely to be reversed, their timing and magnitude could vary
somewhat if Turkey fails to catch up with the recent efforts to raise the retirement
ages in the EU, introduced as a policy response to increasing dependency ratios.
However, there already is a move to increase the retirement age in Turkey as
Turkish pension system is already facing financial trouble due mostly to
retirement ages that are lower than what would be expected in a country at
Turkey’s stage of demographic transition (Sayan & Kenc, 1999; Sayan & Kiraci,
2001). Such a policy move can be anticipated to align the retirement age
differentials between Turkey and the EU4 (or other OECD partners of Turkey)
at a level that is compatible with the differences in the age composition of
respective populations, at least until a further wave of retirement age increases in
Turkey’s faster aging partners is introduced. One can expect therefore that despite
the lag between the rates at which their populations age, same type of policy
responses introduced at comparable stages demographic transition in the EU and
Turkey would leave our labor market results largely unaltered. Similar comments
apply to other variables of key interest establishing that spillovers of the
demographic shock in EU4 would intensify the changes that Turkey would
experience during its own demographic transition.
When combined with results on the direction of exchange rate movements, the
labor market results reveal an important policy challenge for Turkey over the
periods when the timing of declines in the real exchange rate (i.e., domestic
12 A closely related point is made by Turner et al. (1998), who argue that income to be earned
from OECD investments flowing into non-OECD countries with higher returns may help offset the
adverse effects of aging populations on living standards in OECD. The authors immediately add,
however, that for the OECD to reap such benefits, non-OECD countries to receive these investments
may have to undertake structural reforms in capital as well as product and labor markets so as to be
able to accommodate incoming capital.
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currency appreciation) matches that of the increases in wages resulting from
reductions in labor supply (see Fig. 4). Clearly, Turkey’s competitive position in
international markets would be affected negatively by the parallel movement of
these effects, and the country should be prepared to experience a deterioration in
its current account during these periods. While such a development would be a
direct result of the country’s own demographic transition, transmission of shocks
once again appears to amplify it dimensions. Once again, policies that affect the
pattern of labor supply (such as those affecting the retirement age or workforce
participation rates) may change the timing of wage rate increases (Sayan & Kenc,
1999)13 to minimize their effects on the competitive position of the country.
5. Conclusions
Demographic projections for industrial countries including most of the EU
area indicate that the fraction of the population over 65 will increase considerably
in the next few decades, primarily as a result of the fertility shock of the late
1940s and the 1950s. The growth in the population share of elderly is becoming
increasingly evident in many countries as the generations born during these
decades (i.e., baby boomers) keep getting older. The already visible increase in
dependency ratios resulting from the baby boom shock points to potential
changes in such macroeconomic variables as national savings and investment,
and requires alterations in the levels and/or the composition of government
expenditures. Such macroeconomic changes are also likely to generate micro-
economic consequences as they will affect relative prices of consumption and
investment goods, as well as tradables and nontradables. Since small countries
outside the EU or North America trade intensively with the industrial countries
that currently experience population aging, trade must be expected to act as a
channel for transmission of the effects of demographic shocks onto small
countries through these relative prices. Similarly, the changes in interest rates
in major suppliers of foreign capital to the rest of the world are likely to serve to
the transmission of demographic effects to other countries. While the implications
for countries, which experienced the demographic shocks themselves, have been
investigated somewhat thoroughly in the literature, the potential for the trans-
mission of these effects onto other countries has largely been overlooked so far.
In order to contribute to the filling of this gap in the literature, this paper
addressed the issue by considering the effects likely to be transmitted from four
major nations of the EU (EU4) onto Turkey—a small, middle income country
that heavily trades with them. The magnitude and the direction of these effects
upon Turkish economy were investigated within a dynamic, OGs, general
13 See also Turner et al. (1998) for a discussion on policies to affect participation rates and
their consequences.
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equilibrium framework. Despite its complexity, flexibility of the modeling
framework enabled us to capture the differing nature of demographic transitions
in the EU4 and Turkey, and to separately analyze the effects of Turkey’s own,
shock-free demographic transition with and without the transmission effects. The
model employed here was noted to extend past work in various directions. Salient
features of the model included the use of an open economy setup with variable
terms of trade and an imperfectly elastic supply of foreign savings where both the
EU4 and Turkey were assumed to face a finite supply of savings from the rest of
the world. This treatment was argued to be particularly suitable for industrial
economies of the EU as well as a middle income economy like Turkey, despite
the small size of the Turkish economy with respect to international flows.
Simulation results reported in the paper suggest that the demographic develop-
ments leading to population aging and changes in age composition of the
population are likely to affect the time paths of major macroeconomic variables
significantly. Furthermore, the demographic shock in Europe is expected to
magnify these effects visibly and will therefore have implications for such
variables as consumption, savings, investment, output, and labor supply in
Turkey, as well as the wage, exchange, and interest rates in the country.
While the discussion in the paper has so far tried to shed some light on the
possible effects of demographic developments in Europe on Turkey, the results
have implications also for other countries such as Mexico and other Latin
American countries that have a large volume of international transactions with
the US and Canada, where gradual aging of population is well under way. The
transmission issue should also be a matter of concern for Asian countries that
heavily trade with Japan and other industrial countries, as well as attract sizable
amounts of foreign capital from these countries. The increasing degree of
openness of small countries, the process of globalization, and the associated
increases in the volumes of international commodity and factor flows should be
expected to facilitate the transmission of demographic shock effects even further
and make small countries increasingly susceptible to changes in the terms of trade,
interest, and exchange rates in large countries. Coupled with the results presented
here, this observation clearly points to a need on the part of all small developing or
middle income countries to carefully watch the demographic developments in
large industrial nations with which they have strong economic ties, while taking
the implications of the aging of their own population into account.
If supported by appropriate policy measures taken in a timely fashion, such
developments in large countries with aging populations may present opportun-
ities for small countries with young populations. As discussed in Section 4, one
possible area for differing rates of aging in two groups of countries to present
itself as an opportunity for younger nations is the interest rate differentials
expected to arise as domestic interest rates in the OECD/EU area begin to fall as a
result of the changing saving behavior of older populations. As a development
that is likely to hit the faster aging nations of the world earlier than others, this
would make it possible for younger nations to attract sizable amounts of foreign
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capital. The countries that would benefit the most out of this movement of capital
across the borders would naturally be the ones that are best prepared to
accommodate these inflows of capital. So, the countries with younger populations
wishing to attract a higher share of capital from aged-population economies will
need to transform their capital, as well as labor and product markets, into a form
that is compatible with the needs of large country investors seeking higher
returns. As for the timing of policy reforms, small countries should remember that
such positive interest rate differentials would not be permanent as inflows of
capital they receive would, after a while, bring their domestic interest rates down
to the levels of large country interest rates, equalizing returns and hence causing
incentives for capital inflows to disappear. Furthermore, it should be remembered
that there would also be times when demographic developments experienced by
small countries themselves would lead to adverse effects such as a reduction in
their competitive position, causing, in turn, a deterioration in their external
balances. Since demographic spillovers from large countries tend to magnify
these effects, the problems facing small open economies could be worsened by
the transmission mechanisms. As discussed in Section 4, various policies could
be used to avoid these adverse effects, such as the ones designed to increase
retirement ages or workforce participation rates. It should be kept in mind,
however, that the timing of such policy responses would especially be important
as delayed policy measures, as well as the steps taken too early, may significantly
affect expected outcomes.
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